The evolution of Islamic State’s strategy by Solomon, Hussein
21 




University of the Free State1 
Abstract 
Despite having a vast number of forces arrayed against it – the United States-
led coalition, Putin’s Moscow, Iran and its proxy, Hezbollah, Kurdish Peshmerga 
and the regimes in Baghdad and Damascus – Islamic State (IS) has expanded into 
other areas. Despite losing territory in Iraq and Syria, IS is growing in the Far East, 
the Caucasus and Africa. Reasons for the resilience displayed on the part of the 
jihadis are encouraging polarisation between groups and then benefiting from this 
process. Its diverse funding sources from oil sales to the trafficking of antiquities 
and narcotics have allowed IS to build a war chest in excess of US$ 2 billion. With 
these funds, IS has deployed soft power – digging sewage systems and providing 
stipends to families – to earn the loyalty of its ‘citizens’. IS has also displayed 
superior military strategy combining conventional military doctrine with asymmetric 
warfare. As IS are confronted with superior conventional forces in their heartland, 
however, they embrace more asymmetric warfare. 
Keywords: Islamic State, Iraqi Special Forces, Kurdish Peshmerga, social media, 
funding, soft power 
Introduction 
One of the major reasons accounting for the failure of current counter-
terrorism efforts against IS jihadis is that they are underestimated. In fact, IS 
demonstrates sophisticated command of tactics and strategy – from military and 
psychological warfare to their exploits on social media. Moreover, IS has 
demonstrated an ability to adapt its tactics, and in a fast-evolving environment, 
exploiting its enemies’ weaknesses and ensuring that it does not play to its enemies’ 
strengths. In addition, accurately predicting 
its foes’ responses, IS ensures that these 
responses work towards its broader strategy. 
IS is not merely a terrorist organisation and 
insurgency; it is also a proto-state and has 
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access to political and economic instruments to bolster its nascent statehood. To 
understand its appeal and resilience, we need to explore its political instruments 
(increasing polarisation and sectarian strife, its deployment of soft power and its 
social media outreach), economic instruments, especially as it pertains to funding 
and administering its state, and its military strategy and tactics. 
Political instruments: Increasing polarisation and sectarian strife 
The overall political strategy of IS seems to want to increase polarisation and 
sectarian tensions as seen by the gruesome execution videos it routinely posts online 
of killings of Yazidis, Christians and the like whilst at the same time targeting those 
Muslims of a moderate disposition. Clearly, IS believes that it can only stand to 
benefit from the growing polarisation in society as in the words of the Brazilian 
revolutionary, Carlos Marighella, the “soft centre”2 would be eliminated. Following 
the barbaric attack on the Charlie Hebdo offices in Paris in January 2015,3 a wave of 
Islamophobia has swept Europe, which was intensified by another IS-inspired attack 
on Copenhagen in February 2015.4 In Dresden, Germany, for instance a group 
calling itself the Patriotic Europeans against the Islamification of the West 
(PEGIDA) soon spread to other cities in Germany, like Cologne, Hamburg, Munster 
and Stuttgart, bringing tens of thousands of people onto the streets in anti-Islam 
rallies. This has been replicated in other European capitals.5 Following the multiple 
terror attacks in France in November 2015, Islamophobia again increased across 
Europe.6 This Islamophobia is bound to antagonise an already alienated European 
Muslim community7 – hundreds of whom have already left to join IS. According to 
David von Drehle,8 the numbers of European Muslims who have fought in Syria and 
Iraq are: 
France = 1 200 
United Kingdom = 600 
Germany = 500–600 
Belgium = 440 
the Netherlands = 200–250 
Sweden = 150–180 
Denmark = 100–150 
Austria = 100–150 
Spain = 50–100 
Italy = 80 
Finland = 50–70 
Norway = 60 
Switzerland = 40 
Ireland = 30 
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The return of these trained jihadis to their respective countries has also 
served to increase European citizens’ security anxieties. Moreover, the tens of 
thousands of migrants fleeing IS from Syria, Iraq and other countries into Europe, 
have created the perfect opportunity for IS to infiltrate the masses of genuine 
refugees with their own trained operatives to wreak havoc in Europe. Given the 
waves of desperate humanity at their doors, many European countries did not have 
the opportunity to go through the necessary security checks for each and every 
migrant allowed into the European Union. In some instances, even rudimentary 
checks, like photographing and taking the fingerprints of these migrants, were not 
done. Under the circumstances, Aaron Brown9 estimates that IS has 4 000 covert 
gunmen already in Europe, whom they have smuggled in amongst the refugees. The 
resultant fear amongst Europeans, made worse by the 2016 attacks on Brussels, has 
only served to fan the flames of Islamophobia further. 
A similar hardening of attitudes is taking place across the Atlantic, in the 
United States, which has witnessed increased terrorist activity. On 3 May 2015, for 
instance, there was an IS-inspired assault on a Prophet Muhammed cartoon contest 
in Garland, Texas. The two individuals involved, Elton Simpson and Nadir Hamid 
Soofi, were in contact with IS. Simpson, it was subsequently discovered, was in 
Twitter contact with Muhammed Abdullahi Hassan aka Mujahid Miski, an IS 
recruiter from Minneapolis.10 By the end of 2014, 100 Americans had gone to Syria 
to join IS.11 Unsurprisingly, the US public is increasingly viewing Muslims as a 
threat. According to the Pew Research Centre, 42% of Americans say Islam is more 
likely than other religions to incite violence amongst its followers.12 From a strategic 
perspective, the attack on Garland gave fresh insights into the IS strategy and the 
challenge to policymakers. Whilst the militant group’s Bayan Radio claimed 
responsibility for the attack and threatened Americans that “what is coming will be 
worse and more bitter”,13 it is also clear that neither of the two assailants – Simpson 
and Soofi – received financial or military assistance from IS nor discussed their plans 
or even sought permission from IS. Rather, Daniel Pipes14 astutely observes that IS 
does not plan or direct its attacks on Western targets. Rather, it uses its high profile 
to incite Muslims against their non-Muslim neighbours. In other words, IS aims to 
inspire attacks, not plan or organise them. This perspective was reinforced when 24-
year-old Mohammad Youssuf Abdulazeez killed five servicemen in Chattanooga, 
Tennessee, and injured two others when he opened fire on an armed services 
recruiting centre and a military training facility.15  
In 2014, IS also inspired such ‘lone-wolf’ attacks in Ottawa, Canada and 
Sydney, Australia.16 Whilst IS then ran a more centrally organised leadership in Iraq 
and Syria, its leadership was more decentralised outside of the territory it controlled. 
What inspires such lone-wolf attacks is its political ideology – a narrative of alleged 
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grievances17 and a promise of a glorious future. This makes it extremely difficult for 
intelligence services to disrupt – the planning and organisation are done at individual 
level. This is highlighted in the case of Simpson. Despite the fact that he was under 
surveillance by authorities for over a year, the attack on Garland could not be 
thwarted before the event actually took place. This raises interesting questions about 
what is actionable intelligence, and legal questions about when a suspect could be 
apprehended.  
What takes primacy in such terrorist attacks is not the magnitude of the 
terrorist attack itself, but rather the ability to terrorise a population. As insecurity, 
fear and anxiety grow, so too does Islamophobia. This Islamophobia, in turn, 
exacerbates Muslim disenchantment with Western societies and ultimately leads to 
more recruits into the Islamist cause. 
Political instruments: Islamic State’s deployment of ‘soft power’ 
IS also understands that capturing territory is only one aspect of a total 
strategy; that in order to hold that territory, they also need to earn the trust of 
residents by providing basic services. IS jihadists have therefore fixed power lines, 
painted sidewalks, ran regular bus services, removed expired food from markets, dug 
sewage systems, and re-opened luxury hotels and offered three free nights with all 
meals included for newlyweds. In addition, they have started manufacturing 
prosthetic limbs for the wounded and provided rudimentary, if brutal, security to 
inhabitants of the nascent state they control.18  
IS also established Islamic Services Committees to administer electricity 
supply, health spending, education, the cleaning of streets and the provision of 
food.19 Following the capture of Palmyra in Syria, IS also embarked on winning the 
loyalties of citizens by freeing prisoners at the notorious Tadmur Prison. This had 
huge symbolic significance since it was here where political dissidents of the Assad 
regime were not only imprisoned but also tortured. Since the start of the rebellion 
against Assad, the rebellion took on a distinct Sunni flavour. As a result, Tadmur 
Prison hosted many Sunni Islamists, including those of the Muslim Brotherhood. By 
freeing these prisoners, IS styled itself as the champion of Sunni interests against the 
ruling minority Alawite sect as represented by the Assad regime.20 
IS is cognisant of the fact that both Iraq and Syria remain intensely tribal 
societies. Given the weakening of control of Baghdad and Damascus, tribal 
authorities have increasingly become more prominent in these conditions of state 
contraction. Recognising this, IS has established an emir in charge of tribal affairs – 
Dhaigham Abu Abdullah – a Saudi national.21 This was an inspired choice – utilising 
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a Saudi national to co-ordinate with and arbitrate between tribes as opposed to an 
Iraqi or Syrian national who would belong to one of the tribes and would therefore 
be open to accusations of bias. IS has co-opted tribal sheikhs through the use of 
various incentives. These included smuggling of contraband and dispensing grey-
market rights.22 In return, IS expected the unswerving loyalty of these sheikhs. 
In addition, recognising that fratricidal conflict was not in the best interests 
of their nascent state, IS has acted as mediator between tribes. For instance, in the 
Syrian town of Abu Kamal, there have been tensions between the al-Hassoun and 
the al-Rehabiyeen tribes for thirty years. In November 2014, IS deftly mediated in 
the dispute, affecting reconciliation between the elders of the two tribes to the relief 
of all in the town.23 There have been times, however, when IS positions came under 
attack by tribal militias jealous of their autonomy being eroded by IS. Recognising 
that if they use their forces from pro-IS tribes to take on the hostile tribe, it would 
merely lead to more tit-for-tat fighting, which would undermine cohesion within the 
territory of IS, the jihadists pitted members of the same tribe against each other. In 
August 2014, for example, IS got members of the Shaitat tribe in Deir ez-Zor to turn 
on other members of their own tribe, which resulted in hundreds being killed. They 
accomplished this by means of supporting a younger generation of ambitious tribal 
leaders to turn against the older generation through the provision of funds and arms.24  
IS also favours a fairly autonomous form of provincial governance. Under 
each province, local government is semi-autonomous as well. In practice, this means 
that “… local populations can effectively control their own economies through Shura 
[consultative] councils and are therefore more likely to respond positively and 
remain loyal to their new rulers”.25 The ability to control one’s own affairs at local 
level stands in sharp contrast to the over-centralising, ineffective and draconian rule 
emanating from the Iraqi and Syrian governments. Moreover, in deeply sectarian 
societies, such local governments can actually serve to minimise tensions between 
different groups. Even from a military standpoint, this provincial form of governance 
has advantages. It means that IS has active military units throughout the state it 
controls, that it has citizens willing to fight for it and/or support the military, and that 
IS can now fight on multiple fronts simultaneously.26 
As a result, IS have won over much of the populace they control who 
compared them favourably with the neglect or oppression emanating from the 
Damascus and Baghdad governments. This would make the group harder to dislodge 
in future, despite recent temporary setbacks. IS also ensures the loyalty of its 31 000 
fighters (as of 201527) by also involving the entire family unit. Whilst fighters receive 
US$ 100 per month, another US$ 100 goes towards the parents, and each of the 
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fighters’ siblings receives US$ 40 per month. As Ben Hubbard28 has noted, it is a 
strategy designed to win over the entire family, and thereby the community. 
Political instruments: Islamic State and social media 
It is easy to understand the attraction to IS and the corresponding 
disenchantment of younger militants with Al-Qaeda with its ageing leadership and 
its inability to carry out a single major attack against the West. By contrast, IS – 
through its slick recruitment videos – displays that it has carved out a large swathe 
of territory in Iraq and Syria, and its military successes in spite of Western airstrikes 
are appealing to a younger generation of would-be jihadis. Moreover, social media 
also allow IS to be in constant communication with its constituency and also allow 
IS to attract people outside of its cause as can be seen by the growing numbers of 
non-Muslims converting and joining the jihadis.  
A key to the growth of IS, then, remains their ability to spread their ideology 
through the technologically savvy approach to social media propaganda – Facebook, 
Twitter, YouTube and Instagram.29 By March 2015, IS had 90 000 Twitter accounts 
to spread their propaganda and recruit new jihadis.30 Just their English-language 
Twitter accounts have more than 21 000 followers – the majority of these 
concentrated in the West.31 IS also makes extensive use of Zello. This is an encrypted 
application for mobile devices, which facilitates the sharing of audio messages. IS 
utilises this platform to distribute its religious sermons to a younger generation tired 
of traditional sermons given by established and establishment clerics.32 IS members 
extol the virtue of such social media in shaping the narrative on IS and therefore 
influencing the public perception of the organisation. “Don’t hear about us, hear 
from us”, was the popular refrain amongst these IS members when discussing their 
social media outreach.33 Nasser Balochi, a senior member of the IS social media 
team, could not emphasise the importance of social media enough when he declared, 
“This is a war of ideologies as much as it is a physical war. And just as the physical 
war must be fought on the battlefield, so too must the ideological war be fought in 
the media.”34 
The use of rap music in their recruitment videos is especially appealing to 
young alienated youth and is a far cry from the staid videos in which the older 
generation of Al-Qaeda jihadis, like Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, 
appeared. Instead of focusing on sermons from al-Baghdadi, as was the case with 
Al-Qaeda’s leadership-centred videos, IS videos rather focus on the ‘relatability’ 
factor focusing on the IS rank and file. In addition, military successes with slick 
production techniques were the order of the day in these IS videos where a seductive 
narrative merged with powerful iconography.35  
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Cori Dauber and Mark Robinson of the University of North Carolina noted 
in a recent article the sophisticated visual techniques utilised by IS to enhance the 
quality of their propaganda videos. These range from “… choosing starkly 
contrasting colours – think black uniforms and orange jumpsuits – to the use of 
multiple cameras, tight focus, ‘subjective’ angles and intimate sounds to create an 
eyewitness effect”.36 The care with which the terrorist group has approached its 
social media outreach suggests that it understands the value of social media in its 
communication and recruitment efforts. Beyond the quality of its postings, the sheer 
quantity is breath-taking. In a single week, IS produced 123 media releases in 6 
languages, 24 of which were videos.37  
Not all of these videos extol violence graphically depicting the decapitation 
of enemies of the caliphate. Whilst a fair number do demonstrate this, many others 
articulate well-worn Muslim grievances against the West as well as eulogising the 
virtues of the IS, i.e. building schools and operating clinics in the areas they control. 
In the process, they articulate a concrete and alternative vision to the purported 
corrupt, secular, Western-oriented state. In other words, they put forth a vision of a 
caliphate where full sharia law is practiced as a concrete reality.38 This has proved 
alluring. As Elizabeth Whitman39 has observed, recruits do not emanate only from 
those with militant backgrounds, but are increasingly attractive to middle-class 
Muslims who find the idea of a place where sharia law is applied in its purest form, 
appealing. 
In addition to more generic videos, IS is quite adroit at creating videos for 
targeting specific constituencies and exploiting grievances of that community.40 In 
addition to recruitment via social media,41 IS also makes use of targeted recruitment 
via family networks. This was certainly the case of the Portsmouth 5. Five British 
Muslims from the town of Portsmouth, were recruited by means of an IS recruiter, 
25-year-old Ifthekar Jaman, who was a cousin of Asad Uzzaman – one of the 
Portsmouth 5.42  
As was outlined earlier, the aim of such aggressive social media presence is 
not only for IS to put forward its message but also to inspire lone-wolf terrorism as 
we witnessed in Garland and Tennessee. US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
Director James B. Comey refers to this as “crowdsource terrorism” where thousands 
of messages are generated each month encouraging Americans to launch attacks 
inside the United States.43 Worryingly, the FBI has acknowledged that there are 
hundreds of investigations open in all 50 US states into individuals who have been 
receiving messages from IS and who may decide to act on such instigation.44 IS 
videos of extreme acts of violence, so graphically illustrated in its sadistic images of 
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decapitations, also serve to terrify its enemies whilst instilling into its followers a 
sense of omnipotence.45 
Thanks in part to persuasive social media, the penetration of IS ideology46 
even in far-away South Africa is seen in the writings of an 18-year-old South African 
from Johannesburg using the pseudonym of Abu Hurayra al-Afriki who stated,  
I joined the Islamic State because their aim is to establish the world of Allah 
[There is no God, but Allah] as the highest, and the word of Kufr [disbelief] 
as lowest, and this is what Allah tells us in the Qur’an to do. So it is a 
compulsory duty upon all the Muslims around the world to join the Jihad, 
although many of them are misguided and Allah did not choose them …47 
In the South African case, the power of IS social media is also reinforced by 
radical clerics on the ground working with disaffected youth.48 
The power of IS social media was also evident in Nigeria where 24 000 
young people were stopped by authorities from leaving the country between January 
2014 and March 2015. The majority of these were stopped from emigrating for fear 
that they were planning to join IS.49 Authorities account for the increase of IS recruits 
from Nigeria as a result of a combination of three factors: high youth unemployment, 
the alliance between Boko Haram and IS as well as the power of social media. Over 
and above the recruitment videos they put out, IS has also developed close ties with 
Nigerian criminal syndicates to arrange travel documents, visas, air tickets and 
money for their recruits.50 In addition, IS has assisted would-be recruits with 
sophisticated routes to hide their end destination from authorities. In August 2015, 
for instance, India arrested two Nigerian students who were attempting to cross into 
Pakistan and who eventually found their way to Iraq to join IS.51 In the Nigerian 
case, then, IS did not only actively recruit from Nigeria via social media, but also 
assisted would-be recruits to get to IS-controlled territory in the Middle East. 
Exposure to IS social media played a key role in the radicalisation of 23-
year-old Tunisian engineering student Seifeddine Rezgui. Rezgui was a Real Madrid 
soccer fan and participated in break-dance competitions and rap music.52 Yet, within 
a few months of reading IS posts on social media, Rezgui, also known by the IS nom 
de guerre of Abu Yahya al Qayrawani, would kill 38 foreign tourists on a beach 
resort in Sousse with an AK-47.53 His last two postings on Facebook were indeed 
ominous. In the one he wrote, “If jihad is a crime, the world shall know that I’m a 
criminal.”54 In the other, the desperation and hopelessness in his tone is all too 
apparent, “May God take me out of this unjust world and perish its people and make 
them suffer. They just remember you when you die.”55 These words also remind us 
of the high youth unemployment in Tunisia. It was this same impoverishment and 
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hopelessness which resulted in the self-immolation of a young street vendor in Sidi 
Bouzid in Tunisia, who ignited what came to be known as the Arab Spring.56 There 
seems to be a definite correlation between poverty and radicalisation.57 One survey 
conducted just after the 2015 Bardo attack in Tunisia’s poorest region – the north-
west – revealed that over half of the region’s youth were willing to join IS.58 These 
structural conditions also served to make Rezgui more susceptible to radicalisation 
stemming from IS social media outlets. 
Similarly, in June 2015, a 17-year-old Briton – Talha Asmal – enjoyed the 
dubious reputation of being that country’s youngest suicide bomber when he 
detonated his SUV packed with explosives in Baiji – a northern Iraqi town.59 A week 
later, it emerged that three British sisters together with their nine children left the 
country to join their brother also in Syria with IS. In the case of both Asmal and the 
three sisters, what appealed to them was the ideological position of IS communicated 
via social media to establish an Islamic caliphate as this was “… laid out in sharia 
law, as a precursor to the Islamic Armageddon enshrined in Hadith literature, based 
on Prophet Mohammed’s prophecy”.60 
In addition to using social media platforms, IS is also adept at hacking their 
adversaries’ Twitter accounts. On 12 January 2015, for instance, IS hacked into and 
took control of Twitter and YouTube accounts of the United States military’s Central 
Command (CENTCOM).61 The IS member who undertook this operation was Junaid 
Hussain, a 21-year-old hacker from Birmingham, England who was a prominent 
member of the CyberCaliphate, an IS unit charged with conducting cyber warfare.62 
Whilst the Pentagon was quick to announce that this breach of their cybersecurity 
did not compromise the security of sensitive documents, it was clearly an 
embarrassment to Washington and clearly a political coup for IS and their 
supporters, who likely would add further recruits to their ranks. The CyberCaliphate 
also deploys sophisticated encryption methods to avoid detection.63 
Running a sophisticated social media programme, engaging in various social 
projects focusing on community upliftment, deploying softer power, all need 
financial resources. So how is IS funded? 
Economic instruments: Funding Islamic State 
With six out of ten oil fields in Syria and other such oil fields in Iraq under 
its control, IS is in possession of a vast war chest – estimated at US$ 2 billion.64 
Moreover, IS makes an estimated US$1 million per day through the sale and control 
of oil, according to the US Department of the Treasury.65 Much of this oil finds its 
way from the Syrian border town of Besaslan into Hatay, in Turkey – a half-hour 
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drive. In Hatay, oil is a much-prized commodity on account of the high costs of 
‘black gold’ in Turkey – US$ 7,50 per gallon.66 Oil, however, has its drawbacks, 
given the falling price of crude oil on world markets. Oil installations are also 
vulnerable to airstrikes and as such, these IS-controlled oil facilities have been 
targeted repeatedly in air strikes. In recent months, IS has also been pushed back 
from these oil fields and they have been compelled to search for alternative revenue 
sources. 
IS, as any corporation will do in turbulent times, is seeking to diversify its 
revenue stream. One such area is narco-trafficking. Currently, IS makes US$ 1 
billion per year from Afghan heroin trafficked through the territory it controls. There 
is also mounting evidence that IS has expanded its drug-trafficking operations in 
Libya.67 Libya, and specifically the area that it controls in the coastal region of Sirte, 
is also important for IS since this is the base of their human trafficking operations 
into the Mediterranean Sea.68 Perversely, many of those trafficked are refugees 
fleeing from Syria where IS played a major role in their displacement. Moreover, 
having created the conditions of death and destruction in Iraq, the authorities in 
Baghdad have also documented evidence where IS is playing a major role in organ 
trafficking.69 
A further US$ 1 million per day is accrued from extortion and taxation.70 For 
instance, pharmacy owners had to pay between US$ 100 and US$ 200 per month, 
whilst building contractors had to pay between 5 and 10 per cent from every building 
assignment to the group.71 The illicit sale of artefacts from Iraq and Syria also adds 
to their financial resources.72 This can be quite lucrative. In one incident, and from 
a single dig site, IS made US$ 36 million. Some of these artefacts from this single 
dig site were over 8 000 years old.73 The smuggling of raw materials is another 
source of income.74 In addition, IS has captured vast sums of money from bank vaults 
in towns it has captured.75 When IS took over Mosul, for instance, it looted the 
central bank and smaller provincial banks securing a financial windfall of hundreds 
of millions of dollars.76  
Raqqa, the de facto IS capital, also happens to be the breadbasket of Syria. 
Cotton and wheat are produced here and sales of these products find their way once 
again into the coffers of IS.77 In Iraq, a similar dynamic is at play. IS-controlled 
territory in Iraq is where 40 per cent of the country’s wheat is grown.78 In addition, 
kidnapping has proved to be an equally lucrative enterprise. During 2014, IS was 
paid US$ 45 million in ransom payments.79 IS also receives funds from sympathisers 
around the world – most notably from such wealthy Gulf States like Qatar and 
Kuwait.80 David Cohen, the Under-Secretary for Terrorism and Financial 
Intelligence at the US Treasury, notes that both Qatar and Kuwait remain, 
31 
“… permissive jurisdictions for terrorist financing”.81 IS has also attracted donors 
from further afield. Terrorist financing to IS became clear at South Africa’s OR 
Tambo International Airport when five South Africans were apprehended with US$ 
6 million in cash.82 The men were on their way from Johannesburg to Dubai, and the 
money seized was believed to have been destined for IS.83 
All this provided IS with the requisite funds for its operational activities and 
to develop a patronage network earning them the support of locals. In the process, 
IS has displaced rival organisations in a given area. In Mosul and the wider Ninawa 
Province, the jihadist Jamaat Ansar al-Islam and the Ba’athist Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqat 
al-Naqshbandia were forced out by IS essentially buying over local communities.84 
At the same time, the militant group keeps its operational costs low by 
providing small stipends as opposed to large salaries to its ‘employees’ and looting 
military equipment and appropriating infrastructure.85 Ultimately, the deployment of 
its political and economic instrument is secondary to its military strategy and tactics. 
Without the successful deployment of force, IS would not be able to take over a 
given area. Without military victories, IS would not be able to galvanise its 
supporters through social media.  
Military instruments: Strategy and tactics 
Given the religious ideology of IS and its desire to create a caliphate based 
on the 7th-century model of governance of the first Islamic state, commentators often 
view the movement as anachronistic. However, there is nothing anachronistic about 
the military strategy and tactics of IS. Indeed, given the odds stacked against it, the 
group has displayed tremendous sophistication. One major reason for this 
sophistication in military prowess is the fact that the upper echelons of the 
organisation are dominated by hardened military professionals – many from Saddam 
Hussein’s armed forces. Al-Baghdadi’s chief of the general military council of IS 
was Abu Abdul-Rahman al-Bilawi (real name: Adnan Ismael Najm). He was a 
captain in Saddam Hussein’s army and, like Al-Baghdadi, was also imprisoned at 
Camp Bucca. Al-Bilawi was killed in Mosul in June 2014. Another Saddam-era Iraqi 
officer was Abu Ali al-Anbari. Widely considered as Al-Baghdadi’s deputy, he rose 
up the IS ranks on the basis of his military skills and political pragmatism and not 
because of his command of Islamic theology. Indeed, even amongst his IS 
supporters, Al-Anbari’s knowledge of Islam is considered rudimentary.86 Another 
IS commander is Abu Omar al-Shishani (real name: Tarkhan Batirashvili) who 
served in the US-trained Georgian army as a military intelligence officer. He fought 
in the Russo-Georgian War of 2008.87 As with Al-Anbari, Al-Shishani’s knowledge 
of Islam is limited. Indeed he is the butt of jokes on various jihadi forums where one 
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noted that Al-Shishani’s understanding of Islam is “shit”.88 Unlike other jihadi 
organisations, one of the key reasons for IS success is the fact that senior 
appointments in the IS military hierarchy are based on military professionalism and 
not on religious faith. Conversely, Al-Shishani’s death in Mosul in June 2016 will 
negatively affect the military prowess of the organisation. 
Moreover, it is also important to recognise that the group has the dual 
capabilities to fight both conventional and asymmetric warfare on account of the 
weapons which are now in its arsenal. These are:  
 30 Soviet-era T-55 tanks;  
 10 newer T-72 battle tanks;  
 SA-7 surface-to-air missile systems;  
 BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers;  
 Fim-92 Stinger Manpad shoulder-fired infrared homing surface-to-air 
missiles;  
 ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft guns;  
 M79 Osa, HJ-8 and AT-4 Spigot anti-tank weapons.  
Its Cornet ATGM, meanwhile, has been used very effectively on the 
battlefield, for instance when it was deployed against Turkish armour.89 Often, IS 
would switch from conventional to asymmetric warfare and vice versa, in an attempt 
to confuse their opponents on the battlefield. 
Following the IS loss of Kobane to Kurdish Peshmerga and US-led aerial 
bombardment and its loss of Tikrit to Iraqi Special Forces (ISF) in April 2015,90 
many were already writing the group’s obituary. Despite these setbacks, the group 
managed, a month later, in May 2015, to capture Ramadi, the capital of Iraq’s Anbar 
Province as well as Palmyra in Syria. Commenting on this sudden reversal of 
fortunes, Tim Arango and Anne Barnard91 wrote:  
Confounding declarations of the group’s decline, the twin offensives have 
become a sudden showcase for the groups’ disciplined adherence to its core 
philosophies: always fighting on multiple fronts, wielding atrocities to scare 
off resistance and, especially, enforcing its caliphate in the Sunni heartland 
that straddles the Iraqi-Syrian border. In doing so, the Islamic State has not 
only survived setbacks but has also engineered new victories. 
Again, the choice of cities chosen for the offensive was strategic. Palmyra, 
despite its relatively small geographic size, has three main strategic advantages. 
First, the capture of the town gave IS access to new oil and gas fields. This is 
especially important given the US aerial attacks on the group’s current oil 
infrastructure. Second, Palmyra sits astride a critical network of roads by which to 
move one’s forces or to supply them. Third, it is an ancient site providing the 
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militants with another lucrative source of revenues – the illicit trafficking of 
antiquities.92 Ramadi’s strategic significance, meanwhile, lay in the fact that some 
Sunni tribes not only remained outside of IS but in some cases actively resisted the 
influence of IS over the Sunnis.93 With the capture of Ramadi, IS control over Iraq’s 
Sunni heartland was now complete. It is also important to understand that there is a 
close interplay between IS military strategy and the articulation of its political goals. 
Shortly after the fall of Ramadi, IS started to speak on behalf of Sunnis in Iraq, 
articulating Sunni grievances against the Shia Baghdad government. In the process, 
this led to its enhanced perceived legitimacy94 amongst local Sunnis, thereby 
consolidating its military victory in the area. 
From a tactical point of view, the IS strategy to capture Palmyra 
demonstrated excellent command of psychological warfare. Recognising that many 
of Assad’s soldiers in the garrison were demoralised the group decided to add to this 
by decapitating dozens of soldiers and members of their families and widely 
disseminated the images.95 Hardly surprisingly, then, that the garrison at Palmyra 
did not put up a fight. 
The tactical brilliance of IS commanders was on display in the capture of 
Ramadi. Here IS made use of the elements – in this case, timing their offensive with 
the appearance of a sandstorm, to ensure maximum confusion amongst the defenders 
of Ramadi. IS began their attack with 10 massive car bombs – each explosive having 
similar power to that of the Oklahoma truck bomb two decades before.96 These 
explosions levelled entire city blocks, creating mass confusion. At the same time, IS 
sleeper cells in Ramadi started attacking senior officers within the city, decapitating 
command and control within the armed forces. At this point, the ground offensive 
started. The remaining Iraqi troops then fled the city. Despite being outnumbered by 
Iraqi forces, the superior tactics of IS won them the city. 
In the run-up to the attack on Ramadi, IS also revealed its deep knowledge 
of the Iraqi armed forces – demonstrating their ability to reconnoitre and gather 
intelligence on their targets. Recognising that regular Iraqi forces scarcely provide a 
challenge to it and recognising that Iraqi Special Forces (ISF), who were trained and 
armed by the United States, constituted its real threat, it sought to ensure that the ISF 
were as dispersed as possible. In the weeks before their major Ramadi offensive, IS 
deliberately embarked on several minor operations whose aim was to stretch the ISF 
to the maximum. As a result, at the time of the offensive on Ramadi, the ISF were 
dispersed97 across several theatres and could not respond to the capture of Ramadi. 
By July 2015, IS forward positions were a mere 65 kilometres from Baghdad.98  
Recognising how dire the situation actually was for his beleaguered 
government, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi attempted to recapture Ramadi, 
34 
the key to the retake of Anbar Province, in August 2015. However, two Iraqi generals 
– Major General Abdulrahman Abu Ragheef and Brigadier General Safeen 
Abdulmajid – central to the planned offensive were killed by IS. IS made use of 
captured American Humvees, which allowed the suicide bombers driving the 
explosive-laden vehicles to appear as Iraqi soldiers, allowing them to get close to the 
generals before detonating their lethal cargoes.99 In addition to respectively killing 
the deputy head of Anbar Operations Command and the head of the Iraqi Army’s 
10th Division, a number of roadside bombs as well as booby-trapped buildings had 
resulted in large-scale casualties amongst Iraqi soldiers preparing for the planned 
offensive. Needless to say, this not only sapped morale, but it also resulted in no 
major offensive on Ramadi100 in August 2015. Ramadi was only recaptured with the 
assistance of US Special Forces several months later. 
Given the strategic importance of Libya to Europe and Africa, it is important 
to reflect on this troubled country and the advances of IS. In this case, 20 October 
2011 marked the capture and killing of Libyan strongman, Colonel Muammar 
Gaddafi.101 What followed was a short-lived period of hope as Libyans contemplated 
democratic reforms following almost 42 years of authoritarian rule. Hopes were 
dashed as the political vacuum was increasingly filled by IS and Islamist-affiliated 
IS groups. In July and October 2014, Benghazi and Derna respectively fell under IS 
control.102 Since then, IS has expanded the territory under their control in Libya, 
making major advances to the east, south and west of Sirte, including the capture of 
the Gadabya air base.103 IS fighters were also making headway towards Misrata on 
the coastal road to Tripoli. Here again, IS fighters in Libya were being quite 
innovative in tactics using a combination of asymmetric tactics and conventional 
warfare. Conventional IS forces only advance after individual suicide bombers as 
well as those in cars have detonated their explosives thereby sowing maximum 
confusion. As IS fighters advanced on Misrata, suicide bombers wreaked havoc on 
the city by detonating their bombs. In one such incident on 31 May 2015, five people 
were killed and a further eight wounded104 – a clear example of psychological 
warfare. We have seen these tactics being used more recently in IS advances in 
Palmyra in Syria and Ramadi in Iraq.105 The sophistication of IS military strategy in 
Libya was also seen in the fact that their targets were specifically chosen, such as the 
great man-made river water project – the largest irrigation scheme in the world – 
which supplied fresh water to Libya’s parched cities.106 Power stations were also 
targeted. The increased sophistication of attacks seemed to be related to the influence 
of Gaddafi’s former officers, who alienated from the status quo in which they were 
marginalised.107  
The IS modus operandi is quite clear across North Africa: exploit existing 
grievances in a particular area, utilise returning IS fighters to serve as a force 
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multiplier for existing local militias who have pledged allegiance to the group and, 
in order to ensure command and control from IS central, send one of the senior IS 
commanders as the leader of the local franchise. It is this strategy, which was used 
with such devastating results when young militants of the Islamic Youth Shura 
Council managed to capture Derna in north-eastern Libya.108 This strategy was also 
evident in July 2014, when rival groups fought for control of Benghazi in Libya. 
Ansar al-Sharia’s alignment with IS proved decisive. Libyans who fought in Iraq and 
Syria were ordered to return to their home country and fight on the side of Ansar al-
Sharia. These hundreds of battle-hardened veterans proved decisive in Ansar al-
Sharia’s capture of several parts of Benghazi.109  
It is important to understand that IS expansion and penetration into regions 
and countries are not willy-nilly but strategic. Nigeria, for instance, is Africa’s most 
populous country, it has the biggest economy and is a regional hegemon in West 
Africa. The strategic importance of Nigeria for IS should not be underestimated. As 
Peter Pham110 recently noted about Boko Haram –  
We have a group holding territory and shooting down jet fighters … If 
Nigeria collapses – it is the strong state in the region – there are no strong 
states to contain what would happen if Boko Haram succeeds in carving out 
an Islamic state in that area.  
In similar fashion, Tunisia, too was targeted by IS because, according to 
Larry Diamond,111 it is “Alone among the Arab States, it has achieved a remarkable 
level of political compromise among secular parties and the principal Islamist party, 
Ennhada”. Indeed, the moderate Islamists of Ennahda has one minister and three 
junior ministers in the coalition government.112 The terrorist attack on 18 March 
2015 on the Bardo Museum in Tunis in which 21 foreign tourists were killed and a 
further 42 were injured113 as well as the 26 June 2015 deadly assault on Sousse, a 
beach resort, which resulted in 38 foreign tourists killed114 then aimed to undermine 
Tunisia’s relative success at forging a democracy with compromises between 
secularists and moderate Islamists. From this perspective, the objective of the attacks 
was to cause greater polarisation within society between those who are liberal-
minded and those who are religiously-oriented. With more than 3 000 Tunisian 
trained jihadis having returned to their home country after receiving training in 
camps in Iraq, Libya and Syria,115 one could expect more attacks in the future. 
IS strategy in the West, of course, is different as it cannot control territory in 
non-Muslim-dominated regions. As such, its strategy of terrorism is aimed, as 
explained earlier, to increase polarisation and get the authorities to overreact. The 
attacks on Paris in January 2015 – on a Jewish market and the offices of the Charlie 
Hebdo magazine – meanwhile illustrate part of the group’s modus operandi in 
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Europe. The three perpetrators – brothers Chérif and Said Kouachi116 and Amedy 
Coulibaly117 – were well known to the security forces and had indeed spent time at 
the notorious Fleury-Mérogis prison in Paris together118 and were under surveillance 
by French authorities. Knowing this, they simply outlasted the resources and 
attention span of French intelligence agencies by doing nothing untoward to attract 
attention. Once sure that surveillance had ended, they struck.119 This, in turn, raises 
questions for intelligence services everywhere of how does one with limited 
resources maintain surveillance for months on hundreds of targets simultaneously? 
This is made worse by the budgetary constraints as a result of austerity measures 
undertaken by various Western governments. Under the circumstances, Western 
security experts have become quite pessimistic regarding their ability to end global 
jihad. Robert Grenier, a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) counter-terrorism 
expert glumly stated, “The forces of global jihad which Osama bin Laden did so 
much to inspire are stronger than ever.”120 Equally pessimistic, Andrew Parker, the 
head of Britain’s domestic intelligence service noted than an attack on the United 
Kingdom was highly likely.121 
The Paris attacks were also interesting from another perspective. It was the 
first time that Al-Qaeda – more specifically the Yemeni-based Al-Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) – and IS worked together in a joint operation. The 
Kouachi brothers were recruited by AQAP following orders from Al-Qaeda’s emir 
– Ayman al-Zawahiri – to strike at the Charlie Hebdo offices.122 The attack on the 
Jewish market meanwhile was undertaken by an IS recruit – Amedy Coulibaly. 
Phone records subsequently revealed that the Kouachi brothers and Coulibaly 
exchanged scores of phone calls in the run-up to and during the attacks. Could this 
be the start of further cooperation between IS, Al-Qaeda and other radical Islamists? 
Interesting as such a line of questioning may seem, it appears that this was a once-
off, given the deep rivalry between IS and Al-Qaeda. Rather, the co-operation in 
Paris seems a direct result of personal ties forged in the French prison amongst the 
perpetrators of this attack. 
The Paris attacks were important for a different reason too. It demonstrated 
that these radical Islamists could learn from past mistakes and adapt their tactics to 
new circumstances, in particular out-waiting their respective surveillance details. 
The November 2015 Paris attacks also displayed increasing sophistication in IS 
attacks. Here, multiple targets were engaged utilising a combination of suicide 
bombers and gunmen spraying bullets. In the attacks, 150 people were killed and 
hundreds more wounded. The targets chosen included a restaurant, a soccer stadium 
and a nightclub.123 Whilst seemingly randomly chosen, the very ordinariness of the 
targets selected was designed to spread terror – an ordinary Parisian going about his 
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or her ordinary business can be targeted anywhere. The ordinariness of the targets 
was designed to instil terror amongst Parisians. 
Conclusion 
With their recent loss of Mosul to Iraqi forces, IS is certainly losing territory 
with some analysts arguing that their de facto capital Raqqa, in Syria, will soon be 
next. Indeed, by January 2017, they had lost more than 50 per cent of the territory 
they had controlled at the end of December 2015.124 At the same time, it is too early 
to write the group’s obituary. As this article has emphasised, IS remains extremely 
adaptable, and has increasingly moved away from fighting conventional battles with 
the superior forces deployed against them and having engaged in more terrorist 
attacks. On 22 March 2017, an IS-inspired terrorist, Khalid Masood, drove his 
vehicle into crowds at the Westminster Houses of Parliament in London. In this 
terrorist atrocity, 18 people were killed and 50 injured.125 In similar vein, another IS 
attack took place in the St Petersburg metro in Russia in April 2017. An explosive 
device detonated and resulted in the deaths of 11 people with a further 51 being 
injured.126 Unfortunately these attacks are extremely difficult to prevent for the 
security services given the fact that planning is often done at individual level. With 
the loss of its heartland, IS-inspired terrorist attacks, such as those in London and St 
Petersburg, will increasingly be the central feature of the IS modus operandi. 
What is lacking on the part of the international community is a holistic 
response to the multi-faceted threat posed by IS. Whilst the world celebrates the 
jihadi losses in Palmyra, Ramadi and Mosul, the group strikes at Jakarta and 
Brussels. Whilst the international community congratulates itself for destroying IS 
oil refineries, the group involves itself in more lucrative narco-trafficking, human 
trafficking and organ trafficking funding avenues. Whilst intelligence services report 
on the death of IS fighters as a result of drone strikes, the group continues to recruit 
via its social media outreach. Comprehensive approaches are needed that would view 
the struggle against IS over the long term, as opposed to euphoria surrounding short-
term, often pyrrhic, victories. 
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